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Pursuit to the Seine 
The Essex Scottish Regintent and the 
Foret de Ia Londe, August 1944 
Doug W. Mcintyre 
T he II Canadian Corps was to plan for an opposed crossing of the Seine River between 
Pont de l'Arche and Elbeuf and subsequently to 
secure additional bridgeheads both above and 
below Rouen on opportunity. On the left of the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division axis of advance 
was the 7th British Armoured Division on a 
roughly parallel line of advance. On our right 
the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division would be 
driving directly for Elbeuf and to their right, the 
4th Canadian Armoured Division was aimed at 
Pont de I'Arche a few miles east of Elbeuf. 
On 21 August, the Essex Scottish left Point 
152, a northern pivot or shoulder position of 
the Falaise Gap, at the head of the 4th Brigade 
leading the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. We, 
the battalion, formed up in the routine "advance 
to contact" (ATC) formation directed to 
Bourgtheroulde, a town on the sou them fringes 
of Foret de la Lon de, just short of Elbeuf on the 
Seine River. The roster of command that day for 
the Essex Scots was as follows: 
Commanding Officer- Lieutenant-Colonel Peter 
W. Bennett 
Second-in-Command- Major Tom Brown 
Officer Commanding (OC) Support Company-
Captain Doug W. MclntyTe 
OC "A'' Company- Captain Tom C. Stewart 
OC "B" Company- Major Haughton Laird 
OC ··c Company- Major Tim McCoy 
OC "D" Company- Major Telford Steele 
All sub-unit commanders were commanding 
badly-depleted companies, platoons & sections 
following the maulings of the Caen and Falaise 
fighting of the previous weeks ... and no 
replacement personnel were forthcoming for this 
operation. 
At this point in time, still in sight of the 
smouldering town of Falaise, we were less than 
50 miles (as-the-crow-flies) from the Elbeuf/ 
Rouen loop or peninsula in the Seine River. As 
we shall see, we did not reach the outskirts of 
Elbeuf until six days later or after midnight on 
the night of 26 I 27 August. Of course, the actual 
true miles traversed on narrow, congested and 
cratered roads with make-shift bridges could 
have been upwards of 100 miles. But, as 
explained briefly below, this was the only way to 
travel. 
The ATC formation, a manoeuvre well-
rehearsed by all survivors of exercises in 
England, was the accepted procedure for re-
engaging or catching up to a flown enemy. While 
somewhat precarious for the "point" sections and 
platoons of the leading company strung out in 
single file on alternate sides of the axis road, 
companies and battalions could be rotated by 
simple leapfrogging within the marching column. 
Not even the most duty-bound infantry soldiers 
relished the idea of acting as "bait" stuck out in 
front of a divisional column on strange terrain 
and unknown countryside to draw enemy fire 
whenever and from wherever it might come. Most 
though took personal pride in being trusted with 
the point "honours." The pace or rate of 
movement in such a formation was that of the 
leading section of six or seven men on their "flat 
feet," so one can estimate an average of say three 
miles per hour with no road obstructions or 
enemy harassment. This rate placed a severe 
strain on the dozens of tracked fighting vehicles 
of the supporting weapons moving along in the 
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Officers of the Essex Scottish Regiment, England, June 1944. 
Front row. (left to right): J.S. MacLennan, J. Burgess, D. Mackenzie, F.A. Wansbrough, T.S. Jones, J.S. 
MacDonald. F.A. Tilston. VC, H. W.P. Thompson. H. C. Laird, A.R. Johnson. Hayes; Second row: Craw. T. 
Stewart. McCrimmon. ?, D. W. Mcintyre, J. Cardy, J.A. Baxter, T.E. Steele, J.C. Cottrell. E.L. Cohen. G.A. 
Ponsford; Third row: Webster, F.J. Lynch. ?, MacDonald, Chander, ?. B. Mackenzie, Martin, W. Hogan. L.S. 
Bond; Back row: Pofre. J. Cropp. Morgan, Genereau, Watt, F. Chauvin, Hodges, W.C. Wilson, Waddon. 
immediate rear of the marching infantry troops. 
Innovation, in the long run, did more to ease 
this problem than the "training manual." 
Fortunately for the Essex Scots, as the lead 
battalion of the 2nd Division's initial ATC 
operation in Northwest Europe, we had until 
mid-afternoon to get our supporting weapons 
vehicles act in order. As Support Company 
Commander, I started off in the morning with 
my entire 40 or 50 tracked and wheeled 
machines "hugging" the tail of the fourth 
company's last section on the march. Naturally, 
my jeep was never out of low gear, but at least I 
was in the CO's favoured position to direct rapid 
movement forward if and when the lead 
company's "bait" encountered the enemy and 
needed help. 
However, before noon that morning the 
General Staff Officer (G-1) of 2nd Division 
appeared on the scene and directed me to adopt 
the other procedure of pulling my vehicles into 
"harbour" at 20 minutes to every hour (using 
some convenient field as a parking lot). I 
protested that as forward battalion my CO 
wanted us as close as possible to his advancing 
companies. The G-1 assured me he would 
instruct his Military Police (MPs) to give our 
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convoys priority on the road for the other 40 
minutes of the hour. He went on to direct that 
because of congestion and sloppy traffic 
discipline, the Division Commander had made 
the vehicle "harbour" procedure an order. .. and 
that was that. There was pandemonium on all 
roads from then on. Brigade and Division staff 
officers seemed to appear in both directions, 
evidently on their own private reconnaissance 
missions and asking why my regiment was 
"dragging its feet." (Actually, we had few if any 
stops until hitting the enemy ... not even for a tea 
break). Also MPs were charging back and forth 
on Nortons (motorbikes) and some did not know 
what to give priority to. In any event, by early 
afternoon, I pulled out with my jeep, two 6-
pounder anti-tank guns and two double armed 
carriers to join the tail of our marching 
companies permanently, leaving the bulk of the 
support vehicles to perform the "harbouring" 
game. An extra radio system was on so we had 
constant control over the call for more support 
gear as required. 
During all of this jockeying for position in 
the rear of the marching column during the 
morning and early afternoon of 21 August, the 
Essex Scots had passed uneventfully through the 
towns of Damblainville, Barou and Ammeville. 
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Approaching the village of Tortisambert, a few 
miles east of Ammeville, the enemy finally 
showed its ugly fangs. The lead company was 
fired on by machine guns (MGs) and some 
heavier calibre weapons (thought initially to be 
a tank) in an improvised road block astride the 
road into Tortisambert. 
We had arrived at the most crucial instant of 
the ATC battle. Rather a distinction for the Essex 
Scots to be the first to "draw enemy blood" in 
the 2nd Division's Pursuit to the Seine operation. 
A more notable achievement now would call for 
a quick and accurate appreciation of the 
situation and execution of a counteraction to 
overcome the enemy and to continue the advance 
with a minimum loss to the momentum in the 
Division's push to the Seine. 
It was a place for cool, calculated decision-
making. The lead company commander, in 
contact with the CO, launched an immediate 
flanking movement with two platoons and heavy 
MG fire support from the third platoon, 
supplemented by point-blank firing of the two 
6-pounder anti-tank guns which I had sent up 
the last few hundred yards to the front of the 
column with the enemy's first blast ofMG fire. A 
second company was committed within a short 
time on the other flank enroute into Tortisambert 
to back the lead company and to assure a full 
Bay of the Seine 
Pont Audemer 
Pont L'Eveque 
consolidation of the German obstacle. The use 
of our own 3-inch mortars (and Division artillery) 
was not required with the likelihood that our 
assaulting infantry would rapidly overcome their 
objective. This result was achieved after a little 
time in early darkness to mop up and completely 
exploit further in the town to ensure clear 
passage for the remainder of the battalion and 
the brigade following up. Any "fire fight" of this 
nature, even the most minor, has its vicious 
moments. While the CO, with the lead company 
commander, made the correct appreciation of 
the enemy's position without over-reacting and 
perhaps throwing in greater strength involving 
costly time and casualties, the Essex Scots did 
not get off completely unscathed. Private Donald 
R. Smith died in the assault and a promising 
young corporal, James A. Gatschene, died of 
wounds the next day. Picking up our pieces, after 
the Tortisambert delay of several hours, we 
pushed on toward our planned bound for the 
day, Livarot, a town liberated by the 7th British 
Armoured Division on 20 August, and reached 
it about 0400 hours for a few hours of much 
needed sleep and a hot meal. 
Despite the presence of the 7th British 
Armoured Division in the vicinity, our continued 
moves on 22 August yielded numerous and 
conflicting reports from civilians of retreating 
enemy groups, some with tanks, and most in a 
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state of complete confusion. The few German 
prisoners, rounded up from time to time had 
lost contact with their main units and could not 
provide any viable information as to locations, 
directions or strengths. 
The passage through the villages of Notre 
Dame de Courson, les Aumais, Cernay and la 
Cressonnie on 22 August were uneventful but 
most gratifying. Every French citizen in the 
towns, young and old, turned out to cheer on 
their liberators. They presented or threw flowers, 
offered apples, bread and that "forbidden 
beverage" Calvados or other home-brews. (It was 
an offence in II Canadian Corps if officers allowed 
troops within their unit to consume the stuff.) 
Nothing was more rewarding to all of us, even 
VE-Day itself, than this heart -warming reception. 
It alone made our journey worthwhile! 
On 23 August, 4th Brigade stopped at la 
Chappelle Yvon to take up a defensive position 
on a reverse slope for what might be "that pause 
that refreshes," certainly long enough hopefully 
to get my dozens of drivers out of their rattling 
tracked carriers. It was a mild, calm day with 
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A photograph of the author, Doug W. Mcintrye, taken 
just prior to D-Day in Folkestone. England. It was 
sent home to his wife, Rosemary, with the 
inscription, "With Love Darling, Doug." 
(Photo courtesy qf Mclntyre.family) 
beautiful hills around us, if somewhat deadly 
hills as we soon found out. It was the perfect 
setting for a relaxing picnic if one could be 
romantic enough to conjure up such visions 
under happier times. There wasn't much rest as 
the regiment became involved in an "on-again-
off-again" shooting match with the much-feared 
German 88's, rifle and MG fire. Before we moved 
off the following day, we buried two young 
privates, Kenneth W. Bolitho and Richard J. 
Parent. 
On 24 August, we were blessed with the 
arrival in our bailiwick of a fleet of troop-carrying 
vehicles (TCVs), a luxury to an infantry division 
of that era, but common to the infantry element 
of an armoured division. At least those troops 
not performing the lead role could rest their feet 
with dry socks. The 24 and 25 August took us 
through cheering throngs of villagers in 
Courbonne-la-Ville, Cordebugle, Thiberville, 
Duranville, le Mesnil, Brione and Bosrobert-aux-
Poulets. With the exception of the odd stray shot 
and the reappearance of German fighters over 
Brione, the situation was quiet, perhaps too 
quiet. 
At 2000 hours on 26 August, the Essex Scots 
were again leading 4th Brigade toward 
Bourgtheroulde. We had not proceeded more 
than a few miles when it became most apparent 
from the sound effects that a stiff fight was going 
on in the town between the enemy and our own 
Royal Highland Regiment (Black Watch). How 
they (the Black Watch) had arrived in 
Bourgtheroulde ahead of 4th Brigade was a 
mystery. However, they had fought off several 
German counterattacks with fairly heavy (from 
our observations) casualties on both sides. As 
we moved into the built-up area caution was 
required to avoid a conflict with the Black Watch 
in early darkness. We then "ran a gauntlet of fire," 
mostly very heavy mortar bombardment in the 
main intersections, with some artificial lighting. 
A number of vehicles and buildings were on fire 
which assisted our regimental MPs in hustling 
the marching companies directly through the 
town. One such MP became a recruit (later 
permanently) in my Support Company HQ. The 
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moment he parked his Harley, to run 20 feet to 
the centre of an intersection to direct our 
vehicles, his bike was hit by a mortar bomb and 
blown into several pieces. That incident ended 
his driving of a two-wheeled machine forever. At 
the far end of Bourgtheroulde, we linked up with 
the main body of the Black Watch and took up 
defensive positions beyond them. But not for 
long! Before my most able Anti-Tank Platoon 
Commander, Lieutenant Jock McLennan, could 
rush out his six 6-pounder guns to the company 
positions, we received the order "prepare to move 
on." We had been in and out of our intermediate 
objective, Bourgtheroulde, in a matter of about 
two hours, barely enough time to pick up our 
four sad losses or patch up a number of 
wounded. Privates Harold W. Gallant, Peter 
Heckman, George L. Hill and Donald E. Price 
had fought their last battle ... what little there was 
to it on this particular evening. 
Although records are incomplete, during that 
two hour period, Major-General Charles Foulkes, 
the commander of 2nd Division apparently 
considered that 6th Brigade should clear the 
Foret de la Lon de of such enemy that might still 
be present, while 4th and 5th Brigades crossed 
the Seine at Elbeuf with the brigades of 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division. The final decision 
was made to attack the Foret on the morning of 
27 August with 4th Brigade on the right and the 
6th Brigade on the left. Specifically, this would 
mean 4th Brigade entering the westem environs 
ofElbeuf and proceeding north up the river road 
toward Port du Gravier, just under the high 
ground in the middle of the Foret de la Londe. 
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) would 
now take over the lead followed by the Essex 
Scots with the Royal Regiment of Canada (RRC) 
in reserve. The two forward battalions were to 
seize the high ground overlooking Port du 
Gravier and the RRC was to pass through and 
take up a position south of Grand Essart. 
Obviously, Corps or Division intelligence 
summaries could not have indicated a 
strengthening this very day of the "high ground." 
The German 559th Grenadier Regiment (or 
elements thereof) of the 331 st German Infantry 
Division had been reinforced by elements of the 
German 6th Para Group. Unconfirmed reports 
from enemy prisoners taken during the next few 
days revealed that some of these reinforcements 
had been flown to the Rouen vicinity on 25 I 26 
August from Paris with the do-or-die intention 
of preventing us from interfering with the 
German escape activities at Rouen. 
With the order-of-march established as 
above, we moved off from the east side of 
Bourgtheroulde behind the RHLI at about 2330 
hours to reach the Elbeuf area and the river road 
with no problems. For some miles as we marched 
(no place forTCVs here), the high ground loomed 
on our left and as we closed up with the Seine 
River west of Elbeuf, the high ground became 
sheer cliffs on the left with limited shoulder off 
the road. It did not occur to me until too late 
that this was a great spot to get ambushed, just 
like in the old Hollywood westerns. As it 
happened, we were ambushed and trapped in 
the defile for almost three days. 
As outlined above, our ATC function was to 
force the enemy to divulge his whereabouts. At 
Port du Gravier, whether by design or accident, 
he played it very cunningly. At about 0200 hours 
(this was now 27 August) the lead company of 
the RHLI mistakenly took the left fork in the road 
at Port du Gravier instead of continuing on up 
the river. Some 500 yards up the road to the 
north along the valley of the railway they found 
the road was blocked. The Essex Scots became 
the lead battalion, by tactical necessity rather 
than by a brigade order, by remaining on the 
river road in the direction of Oissel and thence 
Rouen. Reports differ, even among veterans of 
that night, as to distances involved and the exact 
timings of the events about to take place. As best 
as we can surmise, Major Laird, "B" Company 
Commander, and now the point company of 4th 
Brigade, was challenged from the forested 
heights to his left to, "Halt," (in good English) at 
a point about 500 yards after passing through 
the railway underpass at Port du Gravier. The 
time was between 0330 and 0400 hours 
Major Laird ignored the command, and 
taking a conventional crash action response 
ordered his platoons to take cover, what cover 
there might have been on the right of the road 
and the narrow meadows falling into the river 
bank. They were immediately fired on by an 
assortment of LMGs, MGs, mortars and 
grenades. The following "A" Company under 
Captain Stewart was still moving through the 
eastern built-up end of the village but it was also 
caught in the same blast of fire and it in turn 
moved off to take cover along the left of road, 
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Left: Port de Gravier looking south back along the road 4th Brigade used to approach the town. The 
precariousness of the river road is apparent with the river on one side and sheers cliffs on the other. The 
rail overpass at the centre of the photo marks the place where the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry missed a 
turn in the road and walked into a road block. By necessity, the Essex Scottish assumed the lead and 
shortly thereafter were attacked by the Germans. Right: The defile where the Support Company vehicles 
were trapped and mortared just outside of Port du Gravier. (Source: Essex Scottish Battalion History) 
where more cover existed. Both commanders 
reported by radio to Battalion HQ that the entire 
river road was covered by fixed, probably ranged-
in fire, lines of fire and not likely manned by 
some "hit and run" rearguard. The cunning 
Jerries had effectively "let slip in" the best parts 
of two infantry battalions, certainly into 
temporary "dead-ends" (if aided by a simple map 
reading error), and now if he possessed heavy 
enough guns could "lock in our rear" by blocking 
us with our own destroyed vehicles. This he 
momentarily accomplished! 
It shortly became apparent that the Germans 
on the hills had ranged-in more than just the 
village of Port du Gravier. The tail of the Essex 
Scots, "C" and "D" Companies with Support 
Company vehicles behind them, had still not 
reached the village, when they were "hose-piped" 
with light and medium mortar fire for perhaps a 
l ,000 yards. Sitting in the river side of my jeep 
with the demolished Port du Gravier railway 
bridge barely visible in the darkness, the string 
of bursting mortar shells could be seen 
progressively approaching our position in the 
middle of the road. A jeep is a sitting-duck target 
any time and Bren gun carriers are a fairly 
vulnerable target for direct hits from falling 
bombs. My orders back along the column had a 
64 
few seconds to be heard- "dismount, forget your 
gear, just small arms and radios ... take cover 
along the cliffs on the left." Not all moved swiftly 
enough. The bursting mortar bombs overtook 
them! I will never know why my own jeep driver I 
batman got under the jeep, instead of the safety 
behind a wall just off the road, where Signals 
Corporal "Chief' Thompson and I had between 
us moved the heavy signals gear. It was too late 
to save Private Harold R. Kalbfleisch, a 20-year-
old boy from Kitchener, Ontario, from parents 
of German extraction. The bomb detonated on 
the thin steel floor in the back of the jeep thus 
contributing to the force of the fragmentation. 
The jeep immediately behind our Company HQ 
jeep suffered a near-miss and caught two 
occupants with shrapnel, one the Pioneer 
Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Angus 
McCrimmon, very seriously. The few dozen 
vehicles further back in the column were spared 
direct hits. 
While Corporal Thompson was setting up 
Support Company HQ in a cave at the base of 
the cliff opposite our burning jeep remains, I 
undertook to get the wounded up forward to our 
Regimental Aid Post (RAP). We located Captain 
Cliff Richardson, Battalion Medical Officer, and 
his heroic stretcher bearers in a spacious cave a 
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few hundred yards short of Port du Gravier. On 
the way, I picked up another seriously wounded 
acquaintance, Sergeant Walter Buszowski of"D" 
Company, another victim of mortar shrapnel in 
the eye. Unfortunately, Captain Richardson was 
unable to save him. It is of note to mention at 
this time, Captain Richardson had personally 
driven his Red Cross van up and down the river 
road, exposed to enemy fire, to pick up such 
casualties as Sergeant Buszouski dying alone in 
the darkness through loss of blood. Captain 
Richardson, was awarded the Military Cross for 
his actions. 
Directed on to Battalion HQ from the RAP, I 
arrived to be advised by the CO that Support 
Company would have no role to play in the late 
morning advance by the RRC and our own "C" 
and "D" Companies 
The CO had been alerted by 4th Brigade 
Commander, Brigadier J.E. Ganong, that he had 
ordered the reserve battalion to make a wide 
flanking movement to the northwest, across the 
Port du Gravier /Moulineaux road and get behind 
the positions "Chalk Pits Hill" and "High Ground" 
which were holding up the RHLI and the Essex 
Scots. 
The RRC advance got off about noon and 
found slow going in the woods. Later in the 
afternoon, the battalion ran into the Fusiliers 
Mont-Royal (FMRs) advancing on the 6th Brigade 
right flank. Still later in the day, the GOC 2nd 
Infantry Division placed the FMRs under 
command of the 4th Brigade. With this turn of 
events, the RRC's plans were changed. They were 
to abandon their attack across the road and 
move northward to a rendezvous (RV) with "C" 
and "D" Companies of the Essex Scots. Our "C" 
and "D" Companies had been moved up from 
below the village during the morning and were 
now covering the battalion's left flank. These 
companies ran into heavy mortar and MG fire 
as they moved into the woods west and northwest 
of the RHLI position. Direction and control were 
difficult to maintain, particularly with the 
harassment of enemy fire. In any event, the RV 
was never established. The Essex Scots' War 
Diary tends to blame the RRC for an "abortive 
attack." We do not have the RRC War Diary before 
us. The 4th Brigade Commander shed no more 
light on the situation other than ordering units 
involved back to the south for a new attack plan 
as soon as it could be launched. 
In the meantime, unlike all "the walks in the 
woods" of 4th Brigade's left flank, heroic efforts 
were being made all day on the far right flank, 
all limited company or platoon sorties. "A" and 
"B" Companies of the Essex Scots had to expand 
their real estate holdings as held at first light on 
the 27th. "A" Company, already in the shelter of 
village buildings in the northeast sector of Port 
du Gravier, formed and executed a plan of 
moving up a steep building-lined sideroad or lane 
to reach the base of the cliffs below "High 
Ground," and thence to get up the heights in the 
cover of small trees and perhaps neutralize part 
of the enemy position. Little was gained and when 
his leading platoon commander, Lieutenant Bill 
Phoenix, was severely wounded along with other 
casualties, Captain Stewart called off the assault. 
With less than 30 all ranks remaining in "A" 
Company, he hardly had sufficient manpower 
remaining to reinforce success. "B" Company, 
originally trapped along the river bank, gained 
some ground during the morning on the left side 
of the road and made the supreme sacrifice in 
trying to exploit this by an assault up the south 
slope of "High Ground." Early in the afternoon, 
Major Laird directed Lieutenant Jim Coombe 
with two reduced platoons in extended line to 
make their way up the steep slope. If any officer 
could get his men to the top, Jim Coombe was 
that officer. Just about one month earlier, he had 
held his ground against a robot tank attack at 
Verrieres south of Caen and a few of his 
"veterans" of that day where still with him. 
However, the climbing assault bogged down as 
the enemy fired ... or perhaps simply let gravity 
move anything that would roll, every step of their 
way up. Coombe was killed some distance from 
the summit, and despite the spirited leadership 
of several section leaders, the momentum was 
lost. 
Around midnight on 28 August, the 
commander of 4th Brigade had left the GOC 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division with a new plan of 
attack to begin as early as possible. (It is of note 
that some of the units to engage in this 
forthcoming attack had not had a hot meal for 
18 hours or more). Briefly the plan was for the 
RRC to continue their wide flanking movement 
and outflank the MG and mortar positions 
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Foret de la Lon de ~',{i::v 
27-29 August 1944 
Foret de Ia Londe 
Legend 
Road 
Rail ~=~=~ 
Rail Tunnel ======== 
Forest 
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de 
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Above: Map showing Foret de la Lande. The railway lines running ]rom top to bottom (Moulineaux-Port du 
Gravier) indicate the course oj a valley dividing the heights to the east and west. The dashed boxes 
indicate the apporximate area shown by the air photos to the right. 
Opposite: Air photos taken on 26 August 1944 (the day before the battle) showing the area contested by 
4th Brigade. The bottom photo shows Port du Gravier, the bombed railway bridge, and the area known as 
"High Ground." Visible just above the downed bridge is the railway overpass seen in the photo on page 64. 
It is easy to see how in the darkness the RHLI missed the jork to the right to continue along the riveT: The 
upper photo shows the areajust north oj Port du Gravier. The railway overpass in the lower l~{t comer oj 
the photo marks the spot where the "C" and "D" Companies oj the Essex Scottish began their attack 
towards "High Ground" on the 28th and were met with heavyjire andjorced to ground. 
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Above: LCMSDS Air Photo 71 I 4429 Below: LCMSDS Air Photo 71 I 3427 
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holding up the line of advance on the right flank. 
At the same time the Essex Scots were to "punch" 
through on the right just north of Port du Gravier. 
Final objectives for the day were "Maisie" and 
"High Ground" for the two battalions respectively, 
with the RRC to consolidate "Chalk Pits Hill" 
with their "C" Company enroute to "Maisie." 
On 28 August all major 4th and 6th Brigade 
attacks were broken up by the intensity of enemy 
defensive fire and our difficulties with the terrain. 
The topography was most favourable to the 
defence of the isthmus and the enemy took full 
advantage in the selection and placement of his 
strong points, albeit his maps were far superior 
to ours. It is interesting to note at this juncture 
that on the morning of 28 August there was a 
momentary intention to abandon the attack on 
the Foret de la Londe and move the 2nd Division 
across the Seine River through the Elbeuf 
bridgehead. However, it was not until later in 
the day that 7th Brigade of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division could consolidate the bridgehead. So 
the major thrust on a full battalion level, that of 
the RRC got underway at 1130 hours on the 
intermediate objective of "Chalk Pits Hill." This 
ground was far less dominant than "Maisie" and 
probably the heavy medium artillery 
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Mqjor Telford "Si" Steele commanded "D" Company 
of the Essex Scottish. Here he is being presented the 
Military Cross for his exploits south of Caen at Tilly-
la-Campagne in July 1944 by Field Marshal B.L. 
Montgomery. 
(Photo courtesy ojT.E. "Si" Steele) 
concentration requested by the Royals to support 
their assault would have changed the end result. 
But these shoots were not made due to the 
unknown location of the South Saskatchewan 
Regiment working down from the north. Some 
success was achieved and with two companies 
reaching the line of the most easterly rail line, 
"Chalk Pits Hill" might have been within grasp. 
Unfortunately, the companies became separated 
in the woods and with that the loss of the 
battalion's momentum meant a stop to the 
attack. 
On the right flank of the RRC, the Essex Scots 
again put its "C" and "D" Companies into action. 
At about 1300 hours they moved through the 
underpass of the railway in the north part of 
Port du Gravier and upon emerging on the east 
side of Port du Gravier /Moulineaux road were 
met with heavy fire from MGs, light mortars and 
cup-discharged grenades. It became immediately 
evident to these two companies, that to come to 
grips with the base of "High Ground" to 
commence their assault, they would have to 
negotiate a steep slope down the railway 
embankment and then cross a narrow valley. It 
turned out to be an insurmountable obstacle 
enroute to the base of "High Ground" let alone 
its summit. "C" Company was commanded by 
Major Tim McCoy. He was a successful staff 
officer seeking an infantry battalion posting, and 
had had a few offensive encounters. "D" Company 
Commander, Major Telford Steele, was the only 
officer to fight his company, exactly one month 
earlier (28 July) into Tilly-la-Campagne, south 
of CAEN, and bring over half of it out. He was 
awarded the Military Cross. But here, at this 
insignificant assault in the north of a small 
hamlet in the Foret de la Londe, past exploits 
and the gallantry of the key leaders, 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
and a few courageous experienced men turned 
out to be incapable of grappling with the 
situation. Many of the men of these companies 
literally slid down the embankment to the valley 
floor- not to get out of it again that day, being 
hemmed in by intense, accurate and sustained 
MG fire. Some were forced to dig in along the 
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left branch of the road for protection and until 
regrouping could begin to force the main 
objective. In this process Major McCoy was 
wounded in the shoulder but refused to be 
evacuated. Shortly afterwards one of his platoon 
commanders, Lieutenant George Jones, while 
rallying his men, was killed. Major Steele 
estimated that close to halfofhis company were 
casualties. The assault on "High Ground" ground 
to a halt. After darkness "C"and "D" companies 
were withdrawn to their original positions along 
the river road southwest of Port du Gravier. 
By late evening, it was learned the South 
Sasks' assault from the la Chenaie area into the 
railway triangle was stopped and the FMRs could 
not disengage from the south to back-up the 
South Sasks' fine effort. 
During the afternoon of the 28th, the GOC 
2nd Division held a conference with Brigadier 
Ganong and the COs of the RHLI, RRC and the 
Essex Scots. The GOC's plan was based on the 
capturing of "Maisie" by the passing of one 
battalion by night through the right two RRC 
company positions, followed by a swing to the 
southeast to take out "High Ground" holding up 
the Essex Scots. During the meeting, the COs of 
the RHLI and RRC expressed the opinion, with 
sound reasons, that at this stage the plan was 
beyond the capabilities of the battalions. They 
also suggested that the enemy were actually 
stronger than Intelligence had indicated and that 
the ground was immensely favourable to defence. 
We are not aware of Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett's 
opinions as may have been expressed at this 
meeting. It is obvious, however, at that moment 
he did not know of the sad fate of his "C" and 
"D" Companies at the underpass/embankment 
conflict back in Port du Gravier. The operation 
as outlined at the conference was considered 
necessary. The RHLI was to make the attempt 
and they moved north to their forming-up-place 
south of the RRC. The operation was to 
commence as soon as possible, presumably 
timed for a pre-first light zero hour on the 29th. 
Once again the ground hampered movement 
and the RHLI made slow progress in reaching 
their start-line in the morning by first light. 
Although field and medium artillery was in 
abundant supply, as well as artillery smoke, the 
RHLI took a considerable amount of time to get 
across the first railway line and move on to the 
second or most easterly line. Early in the 
afternoon, Battalion HQ reported that its three 
forward companies had suffered heavy losses. 
Two of them had been withdrawn some distance 
having continually run into heavy fire from MGs 
and mortars. This message concluded with, 
" ... impossible to proceed with original plan and 
that position must be taken from another 
direction." Later the RHLI were withdrawn to 
the RRC area. 
On the far left 6th Brigade front, the 
Camerons of Canada had withdrawn but South 
Sasks were back in full fight striking again in 
the railway triangle. Here again they were halted 
and counterattacked. However, before they could 
continue the offence, the operation was 
cancelled. Even the Calgary Highlanders brought 
into the picture after the Camerons' withdrawal, 
received a taste of the determined enemy's 
intentions up to the last few hours of fighting on 
the 29th. They suffered a number of casualties 
in holding a position west of Moulineaux. 
On 29 August, the situation on 4th Brigade's 
right flank was much more encouraging. While 
it was a breakout of sorts for the Essex Scots 
only, this battalion is, after all, the featured 
formation of this brief narrative. Sadly, the other 
battalions of 4th and 6th Brigades- the South 
Sasks on the left flank and the RHLI in the centre 
of the line- failed to make the same gains. By 
noon our "A" and "B" Companies found the enemy 
to be withdrawing (on his own bloody time) and 
these companies were able to advance several 
hundreds of yards over part of "High Ground" 
and along the river road toward Oissel. In fact, 
with the clear observation from "High Ground," 
Captain Stewart was able to give fire direction 
to our artillery to engage the still escaping 
Germans over the Seine River in Rouen. By the 
end of the day, all battalions of the two forward 
brigades were consolidating defensive positions 
in preparation for a relief in the line the next 
day. 
We seem to have all but concluded this 
narrative with very little to say about Support 
Company. There is not much to narrate! The four 
rifle companies had limited room in which to 
manoeuvre and when they made their assaults, 
the 4th Field Regiment RCA and the Toronto 
Scottish- heavy mortars and MMGs- performed 
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a more effective task on the elevated enemy 
positions. However, our 6-pounder Anti-Tank 
Platoon could hardly avoid becoming involved 
because of their active commander, Captain Jock 
McLennan. He and his gunners were able to man-
handle a few guns east of the railway 
embankment on 29 August and get a few shots 
off at suspected enemy held rock formations and 
caves on "High Ground." They enjoyed some 
success ... perhaps because the enemy was 
pulling out anyway and wanted to observe the 
prowess of our gunners. It was, evidently, during 
one of these skirmishes on the 29th that 
Lieutenant Angus Murrison, the Battalion Scout 
Platoon Commander, while assaulting his 
platoon with our anti-tank gun support, was 
killed. He and his platoon were probably trying 
to make up for lost time during the last couple 
of days. Their gallant effort, within the pattern 
of entire divisional operation, was to no avail. 
Murrison, a promising young officer, was either 
the second or the third Battalion Scout Platoon 
Commander killed in action during July and 
August. As for Support Company, of which I only 
had the pleasure of commanding for ten days, 
their record of service to the forward companies 
was and continued to be unblemished. All of its 
ranks were dedicated weapons specialists. It is 
a distinction of sorts, that of Essex Scots officers 
serving in Northwest Europe, the first and last 
killed in action were members of Support 
Company (Lieutenant George "Pete" Ponsford, 
Anti-Tank Platoon Commander, 13 July 1944 
and Captain Phillip M. Grandjean, Company 
Commander, 30 April 1945 respectively). Only 
in mid-August, two weeks before this battle, their 
Carrier Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Jack 
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Essex Scottish Officer's Mess. Horsham 
England, 1944. (LeJt to right): Jack 
Burgess. Jack Haggans. Si Steele. Jock 
MacLennan. Doug Mcintyre, Bruce 
Macdonald, Phil Grandjean. Stew 
Jones. Art Zaldon. Hut Laird. Cam 
Ritchie. L. Harper. Tom Stewart. 
(Photo courtesy of Mcintyre family) 
Stewart, Distinguished Conduct Medal, was 
killed while capturing a number, of enemy MG 
nests at Point 151 just north of Falaise. 
Our heavy supporting arms were as usual 
superb! Our 4th Field Regiment Forward 
Observation Officers (FOOs) were with us from 
first light on the 27 August seeking out targets 
of opportunity on "High Ground." Before the day 
was out, white patches began to appear in the 
upper forested slopes as hundreds of 25-
pounder HE shells exploded, tearing trees apart 
with their air-burst effect. From my personal 
observations and those reported from the 
German positions after the fighting, it is quite 
evident that the only discomfort and/ or casualties 
inflicted on the enemy in three days were inflicted 
by our field arty or the Toronto Scottish heavy 
mortars. Company Sergeant-Major Jim Coughlin 
of "A" Company advised me on 30 August, that 
the Germans on "High Ground" had carted away 
all their dead and equipment but that evidence 
was everywhere that shrapnel had pulverized the 
ground under the trees and had also entered a 
number of cave-type dug-outs. This evidence was 
confirmed by blood and wrappings from shell 
bandages and dressings. As we have noted above, 
our field arty was also hampered by the poor 
quality of our maps and also to a large extent 
the pinpointing of prime targets. In one case, 
our medium arty was forced to abandon 
important concentrations for the RRC because 
of a lack of communications between units 
meaning that the exact location of the South 
Sasks was unknown. However, this situation 
could occur in any operation. Even though 
fighter-bombers could not fly in the poor weather 
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4th and 6th Brigade Casualties 
Foret de Ia Londe, 27-29 August 1944 
Battalion 
Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
Royal Regiment of Canada 
Essex Scottish Regiment 
South Saskatchewan Regiment 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
Camerons of Canada 
Total 
of 28 and 29 August, our dear friends the arty 
were always with us! 
With our initial pursuit operation completed 
(we had several later in the year and in 1945 
but none so costly ... or so futile), we will take a 
few sentences to examine some implications that 
should not be buried under the last humble 
infantryman's blanket with him on the banks of 
the Seine. 
Some factors may not have come to light 
before this date. Others from a tactical and/ or 
command aspect may have been studied at staff 
colleges in the late 1940s or 1950s. Most have 
probably been forgotten forever. However, with 
the publishing of the detailed Essex Scottish 
fatality list in the mid-1950s, a more thorough 
research tool can be utilized by those who care. 
For instance, the precise number of those killed-
in-action in early July at Eterville, Normandy 
and wherever else through Oldenburg, Germany 
in late April or early May 1945 can be readily 
established. Thus within the entire pursuit 
operation just completed, the Essex Scots 
suffered a total of 125 casualties of which 30 
were fatal. These included three officers and 
seven non-commissioned officers ... a one-in-
three loss and almost irreplaceable even at this 
early stage of the Northwest European campaign. 
A loss of 125 would not be too hard to bear in a 
full-scale battalion attack. Yet in this operation, 
the Essex Scots had no such opportunity. This 
is not to insinuate we would come off any better 
than the RHLI on 29 August or the RRC earlier. 
But at least it would not appear as if our troops 
were frittered away on incidental skirmishes. 
At first glance, we have tended to overlook 
the approach part of the pursuit operation as 
perhaps some kind of an approach to the 
Wounded 
74 
141 
Killed Total 
22 
44 
Fatal Casualties 
Foret de Ia Londe 
27-29 August 1944 
59 
118 
96 
185 
20 
99 
577 
The Essex Scottish Regiment 
27 August 1944 
Lieutenant James 0. Coombe 
Sergeant Walter Buszowski 
Corporal Owen T. Wilson 
Private Alfred Arsenault 
Private John F. Beston 
Private Gordon H. Colville 
Private William L. Fish 
Private James G. Hill 
Private Harold R. Kalbfleisch 
Private Bernard L. McFadden 
Private Bruce W. Murdoch 
28 August 1944 
Lieutenant George H. Jones 
Corporal Marvin Burke 
Corporal Albert Chadwick 
Corporal Ralph E. Chamberlain 
Private James A. Oldman 
Private Harold E. Malott 
Private John E. Marvyn 
Private Stanley Thorpe 
Private Raymond W. White 
29 August 1944 
Lieutenant Angus Murrison 
Sergeant Charles R. Wilson 
startline. Yet eight men named earlier lost their 
lives in the field and by the Essex Scots fatal! 
wounded ratio, we can assume another 28 to 30 
all ranks were wounded up to 26 August. The 
confirmed figure for the main objective, Foret 
de la Lande, 27, 28 and 29 August was 96 of 
which 22 were fatal. On 27 August 11 were killed, 
on 28 August nine were killed and on 29 August 
two met their deaths. The six infantry battalions 
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of 4th and 6th Brigades had a total three-day 
casualty toll of 577 all ranks, from a brigade 
commander down. See box for details. 
Balancing the above losses against results 
or objectives taken is a complete impossibility. 
Colonel C.P. Stacey in his The Victory Campaign 
sums up the matter very simply, "It is evident 
that in these three days of unpleasant fighting 
the 2nd Division failed to make an important 
impression upon the strong enemy positions east 
of the valley in the Foret de la Lande. The hard-
fighting Germans holding them carried out their 
task of covering the river crossings at Rauen, 
and withdrew only when it had been completed." 
Thus, as with very few operations before this 
one or after, we begin to wonder about the sudden 
persistence on the part of the GOC, 2nd Division? 
As early as the late afternoon of 26 August, there 
is some record of indecision at 2nd Division. 
There were undoubtedly options open, for 
example, having 6th Brigade clear the Foret and 
pass 4th and 5th Brigades to Elbeufto cross the 
Seine with 3rd Division. At least there is no 
indication the GOC, 2nd Canadian Corps was 
pressing for a total 2nd Division involvement to 
clear the Foret. Then later on the morning of the 
28 August, at a time when some weight should 
have been given to the horrendous results of the 
RRC and South Sasks fighting in the woods 
during the afternoon of 27 August, the option of 
abandoning the attack on the Foret was still open 
and was considered. 
The "piece-meal" destruction of 4th and 6th 
Brigades was to continue on through the day of 
28 August, even though 3rd Division had 
consolidated their bridgehead at Elbeuf and had 
units opposite Oissel pushing ahead very rapidly 
for Rouen. Why then did the GOCs " ... consider 
it necessary that a battalion be moved around 
by night (it turned out to become the RHLI's time-at-
bat) to make an attempt to capture "Maisie" and "High 
Ground"" at an "0" Group (conference) held in 
mid -afternoon of the 28th ... the attack to be in 
progress most of 29 August? Was there some 
kind of a fierce, rules unwritten, Patton/ 
Montgomery-type competition going between 
divisional commanders to be the first to reach 
Rouen? We were already aware of the GOC's 
stubborn haughtiness and apparent disregard 
for the well-being of an infantry regiment. We 
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will not enlarge at this time. It is hardly fair under 
the circumstances. 
On 30 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett 
reorganized the battalion on a three rifle 
company basis with 85 to 90 all ranks each. Our full 
strength would normally be four rifle companies 
of 137 all ranks. We presume the South Sasks 
and others had to make similar adjustments. 
We were barely able to reform ranks after a few 
reinforcements arrived into some semblance of 
a first rate infantry outfit by early October for 
the Breakout of Antwerp, Belgium. 
By 1 September, the Essex Scots were 
tumultuously welcomed back to Dieppe. One 
would hardly think we had been gone for two 
years and two weeks! Among a few ceremonious 
events of the next few days was a battalion March 
Past in honour of those survivors of the 19 
August 1942 Raid still serving with the regiment. 
All seven men took the salute with pride, and 
perhaps a tear in their eyes. And so it goes with 
an infantry regiment ... and thank heaven for 
esprit de corps! 
The editors of Canadian Military History would 
like to thank Fran Crummer for bringing this 
article to our attention, and for her tireless efforts 
to .find photos to accompany it. 
Lieutenent-Colonel Doug W. Mcintyre 
mobilized with the 1st Battalion. The Kent 
Regiment in 1940. He later joined the Essex 
Scottish Regiment in the United Kingdom and 
served with that unit as a company 
commander and second-in-command. 
During the battle to liberate Groningen, 
Holland in April 1945, Mclntrye, then 
commanding "A" Company, discovered a 
bridge intact over a major canal. He quickly 
launched an attack with his company 
mounted in Kangaroos. The bridge was 
captured and greatly facilitated the liberation 
of the town. He was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Order for his actions. 
Following the war, Mclntrye rejoined the 
Kents and served as their commanding officer 
from 1951 to 1954 when the regiment was 
amalgamated with the Essex Scottish to form 
the Essex and Scottish Kent. Doug Mcintrye 
passed away in 1981. 
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